

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Predator's Progress: the bureaucratic challenges to the Clinton administration's development and deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (1993-2001)

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ABSTRACT

The utilization of drone technology by successive American administrations continues to provoke global protest. However, the operational and political basis for their use can be found in the 1990s, when they first became viewed as a pragmatic, cost-effective surveillance platform during the Clinton administration. The evolution of the U.S. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) program reveals far greater continuity between successive administrations than has been previously acknowledged. This paper examines the bureaucratic challenges that the Clinton administration faced as it sought to implement the nascent UAV technology in its own war on terror, with little public scrutiny or outrage.

Introduction

On 16 August 2021, President Biden unveiled his administration's approach to dealing with America's adversaries: 'We've developed counterterrorism over-the-horizon capability that will allow us to keep our eyes firmly fixed on any direct threats to the United States'.[1] The implication was that rather than relying on the deployment of U.S. ground forces, the White House would utilize a growing range of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to keep its enemies at bay. Over the past twenty years, following their deployment by successive administrations, UAVs have become a key component of U.S. military operations. This, however, was not always the case. Their development and deployment were subject to political and bureaucratic machinations during the 1990s that stalled their incorporation into the range of options available to the commander-in-chief. Their utilization by George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden was only possible because of decisions made during the administration of Bill Clinton. In the years since the Clinton administration left office, the American UAV program has developed considerably, becoming a key asset in the War on Terror, as well as in subsequent operations launched against American adversaries, including al Qaeda, ISIS, al Shabab, and the head of the Iranian Quds Force, Qasem Soleimani. They have, however, also been responsible for catastrophic failures, including the indiscriminate loss of life in collateral damage scenarios.

This paper examines the bureaucratic challenges the Clinton administration faced in its efforts to develop, deploy, and arm this generation of American UAVs. Despite their eventual success, the efforts to introduce these vehicles into U.S. military and intelligence operations faced a series of bureaucratic challenges that threatened their very existence. The Clinton administration's grand strategy has thus far gone largely under-examined, and while and the development of drone technology has received attention, researchers have tended to focus on the period after the

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Clinton administration left office, treating the 1990s as a prelude to the subsequent War on Terror. This has exacerbated an orthodox view of the Clinton administration as lacking focus on international affairs. Rather than examining the technical issues that the UAV program had to overcome as several academics have successfully done, this paper builds on my previous work in *Clinton's War on Terror* to account for the political and bureaucratic challenges that hindered their progress. It considers the rationale for the UAV program, the elements within the federal bureaucracy that hindered their development, the bureaucratic competition to operate the vehicles, and the effects of this resistance. The paper, therefore, provides an insight into the reality of implementing policy within the U.S. government bureaucracy and the in-built inertia that administrations face in their efforts to implement change.

The Clinton administration faced three distinct challenges to its UAV program: The first came in securing the correct vehicle; the secondly was to its deployment and, thirdly, to its efforts to arm the system. These challenges contributed to delays in the vehicles' development, ensuring that a fully operable, armed UAV was not available to the United States until shortly after the Clinton administration's departure from office in January 2001. This article will consider the three challenges that the administration faced in its efforts to develop, deploy, and arm the UAV as a tool of U.S. grand strategy in the 1990s. Once these challenges are revealed, the delays in implementing the deployment of the UAV, and the implications that this had for the United States, becomes apparent.

Materials and methods

Although a small range of material addresses the Clinton administration's approach to foreign policy, including John Dumbrell's *Clinton's Foreign Policy*, and James D. Boys' *Clinton's Grand Strategy*, few scholars have addressed the development of UAV technology during its time in office. Instead, researchers have offered a broad overview of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, with cursory references to the pre-9/11 era, treating the time as a precursor to the War on Terror. Examples include Ian Shaw's *Predator Empire*, Ron Bartsch, James Coyne and Katherine Gray's *Drones in Society*, Christopher J. Fuller's, 'The Eagle Comes Home to Roost: The Historical Origins of the CIA's Lethal Drone Program', in *Intelligence and National Security*, Chris Woods' *Sudden Justice*, and Bill Sweetman's article in *Popular Science*, 'Drones: Invented and Forgotten'.[2] Overlooking this era in the development of UAVs ensures that the challenges posed to their development, deployment, and eventual armament remain obscured. To address this, the following article builds upon my previous work in *Clinton's War on Terror* to focus on the challenges faced by the Clinton administration as it sought to develop, deploy, and arm a UVA platform during its eight years in office. It does so to enable a greater appreciation of the competing bureaucratic interests that hindered the vehicle's development and deployment. The examination of declassified documents, and first-hand accounts of the era reveals the extent to which bureaucratic sensibilities and personal motivations hindered the implementation of the UAV program during the Clinton years.

This article utilizes the Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) to better appreciate the challenges the Clinton administration faced. As Weldes noted, 'The study of bureaucratic politics focuses on conflicts over interests'.[3] Although other, newer, frameworks exist with which to address the implementation of policy, including Social Construction of Technology, Actor Network Theory, and Assemblage Theory, BPM remains an appropriate approach to adopt in this instance. As Drezner observed, the application of BPM to foreign affairs is particularly apt for two reasons: Firstly, because domestic policy actors have minimal influence in foreign affairs, with members of congress having little electoral incentive to take an interest in foreign policy the role and profile of other actors, particularly the various government bureaucracies, is enhanced. Secondly, foreign policy institutions 'rarely have monopoly control over an issue and must, therefore, cooperate with each other in order to implement policy'.[4]

The concept of studying the influence of a bureaucracy and related bureaucratic politics in the foreign policy decision-making process can be traced back at least as far as Max Weber's *The Theory*

of Social and Economic Organizations. The use of BPM reflects the fact that the United States suffers from 'separated institutions sharing powers'.[5] The model has its roots in the work of several key scholars: Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, Neustadt, and Hilsman.[6] The additional work of Destler, Steinbrunner, Gallucci, as well as Spanier, J., and E. Uslaner were also influential.[7] It is, however, with Allison, Halperin, and their co-authored work that the concept is most associated.[8] Use of this model provides a framework within which to explore the turf wars occurring within the administration, and to address issues of personality and organization as they impacted the evolution of the UAV program during the Clinton era.

As defined by Allison, the use of BPM, despite its age, remains apt, since the interests of bureaucratic players are derived from 'national security interests, organizational interests, domestic interests, and personal interests'.[9] It remains appropriate since it is 'commonly recognized among analysts of foreign policy that the interpersonal interactions and dynamics of the decision-making group are key to understanding the policy process and the eventual policy output'.[10] Likewise, as Miles observed, 'where you stand (on any particular policy) depends upon where you sit (within a bureaucracy)', and, as this article demonstrates, examples of such behaviour occurred repeatedly in the development of the UAV program.[11] An examination of the exact wording of declassified documentation reveals the extent to which bureaucratic politics impacted the development of the UAV program during the Clinton administration. The utilization of BPM contributes not only to our comprehension of the evolution of the UAV program during this time, but also enables a greater appreciation of the way individuals, and the various branches of the United States government interact with each other, often to the detriment of the national interest. Vitally, BPM distinguishes between an academic approach to the study of government, based on the theoretical application of rules and regulations and how things are 'supposed' to happen, and the reality, whereby individuals and bureaucracies compete for attention, funding, and political favour. As Allison and Halperin conceded, 'the terms of daily employment cannot be ignored: government leaders have competitive, not homogeneous interests; priorities and perceptions are shaped by positions'.[12]

Any methodological approach has its limitations, and the Bureaucratic Politics Model is no exception. Writing in 1973, Robert Art was particularly damming, insisting that BPM was 'too sloppy, vague, and imprecise as presently constituted to make its use worthwhile'.[13] Three years later, in 1976, Freedman observed that Allison's focus on a lack of bureaucratic cohesion 'need not be simply a consequence of the breakdown of elite unity and indiscipline in the ranks … it is still extremely difficult to co-ordinate governmental activity'. All too often, policy 'can thus look very messy even without the complications introduced by self-interested and scheming bureaucrats … Bureaucratic politics is not, therefore, a necessary, let alone a sufficient, condition for policy incohesion'.[14] It has also been noted that such bureaucratic incohesion is less likely within the American system of government since 'continuation in office depends upon presidential sufferance'.[15] As Hoyt highlighted, the upper echelon of government employees are political appointees, selected, in part, due to their political compatibility with the president and his aspirations. Such individuals, therefore, would appear unlikely to advocate ideas contrary to those of the president, ensuring that consensus would prevail. This critique, however, ignores the potential for seemingly loyal appointees to 'go rogue' and champion the bureaucratic priorities of their department over the broader policy interests as directed by the White House.

In addition to the challenges presented by any methodological approach, issues exist regarding source material. I have sought to base this paper on declassified material, however, this itself presents challenges regarding the declassification process, the availability of documentation, and attending issues related to national security. Although most files pertaining to this period remain sealed at the Clinton Presidential Library on the grounds of national security, I have sought to construct an understanding of the administration's efforts based upon those documents that have been declassified, along with the recollections and testimonies of former White House officials, recognizing the potential for bias that such documents may betray. Despite the best of intentions, therefore, selection bias is a challenge since research requires 'explicit and systematic analysis' for an

accurate and fair rendering of the sourced material.[16] As Ikenberry observed, 'American security and national interests can be best advanced by promoting international order organized around democracy, open markets, multilateral institutions and binding security ties'.[17] The use of the Bureaucratic Politics Model helps reveal the extent to which Ikenberry's perspective can be undermined not by outside forces, but by internal agencies, acting in defence of power bases and bureaucratic sensibilities.

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The Clinton administration came to office following a campaign focused on reviving the domestic economy and was determined not to lose political capital on foreign interventions. Two incidents, however, prompted the White House to identify an unmanned alternative to existing surveillance techniques. On 3 October 1993, two Black Hawk helicopters were lost in Somalia, killing eighteen Americans in the worst day of battlefield casualties during Clinton's presidency. The incident led to the reversal of an emerging grand strategy based on Assertive Multilateralism and a collapse in support for a continued American presence in Somalia.[18] Two years later, on 2 June 1995, Captain Scott F. O'Grady of the 555th Fighter Squadron, was shot down behind enemy lines in Bosnia, presenting the Clinton administration with yet another challenge of a downed aircraft and its crew. Having been deployed as part of NATO's *Operation Deny Flight*, O'Grady spent six days behind enemy lines before being rescued by U.S. Marines.[19] Both incidents became the topic of best-selling books and successful films, contributing to a lack of public support for overseas deployments.[20] They also exacerbated the perception that the Clinton administration was 'gun shy'.[21] Any initiative, therefore, that reduced the financial and political costs of overseas deployments, while enhancing U.S. capabilities, would be welcomed by the Clinton White House.

The Clinton administration discovered, however, that bureaucratic politics presented a considerable challenge to its aspirations. Time and again, issues of cost, responsibility, and departmental pride impacted the development, deployment and arming of the UAV program, as the Defence Department, the CIA, and the State Department all took issue with the emerging technology. A serious bureaucratic clash emerged between the CIA, which initially procured the vehicles, the Army, which initially operated them, the Air Force, which sought to operate them, and the State Department which sought to prevent their weaponization. The disagreements reflected Art's notion that the 'diffusion of power is thus the structural starting point from which actors and analysts must begin their respective tasks'.[22] These bureaucratic challenges presented themselves at three distinct phases of the UAV's progress throughout the Clinton administration: During their development, their initial deployment, and during the attempt to arm them.

Challenge 1: developing a UAV program

During Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign for the presidency, his foreign policy adviser Nancy Soderberg was briefed that 'a number of programs to develop and deploy short and medium UAVs should be given priority' since initial designs 'proved their worth during Operation *Desert Storm*'.[23] A UAV program was of great appeal to the Clinton administration as it took office amid the on-going civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Of particular concern to President Clinton was the inability to locate Serb artillery positions being used to indiscriminately shell Sarajevo. At the time, the U.S. was dependent on KH-11 satellites, operated by the CIA, to track enemy movements and arms shipments into Bosnia, and high-altitude U-2 surveillance aircraft to collect information on the strength of Serb forces.[24] Despite the financial resources of the Pentagon, it was the new Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), James Woolsey, who took the initiative to actively pursue a UAV for the Clinton administration. Despite lacking any experience in the intelligence community, Woolsey 'was a natural at integrating technology and human intelligence'.[25]

Woolsey was briefed about the developmental UAV initiative by the CIA's Deputy Director of Operations, Thomas Twetten, who advocated the initiative despite a lack of support from the agency's pilots. The solution to the bureaucratic inertia, Twetten suggested, was in a joint venture

with a private company. Coincidentally, Woolsey was already familiar with Abraham E. Karem, an Iraqi-born engineer who emigrated to the United States in 1977, before founding his company, Leading Systems Incorporated. With funding provided in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Karem manufactured the Albatross, a UAV with a built-in camera able to remain airborne for 56 hours. With extra funding provided by the Navy, the Albatross developed into Project Amber in 1985. Despite developments in GPS technology, and the Amber drone's ability to monitor drug trafficking, neither the Army nor the Navy chose to purchase the system, leading Congress to consolidate UAV funding and cancel the Amber initiative in 1988.[26]

The assets of Leading Systems Incorporated were purchased by General Atomics in 1990, leading to the development of the GNAT-750 UAV. Both Leading Systems Incorporated and General Atomics sought to develop UAVs for the Pentagon and the CIA during the 1980s, but the differing focus of the organizations ensured that their priorities did not align. With its focus on surveillance and espionage, the CIA sought 'smaller, lighter, cheaper drones that could take pictures and intercept communications in situations where satellites or high-flying spy planes did not offer enough coverage'. The agency hoped such vehicles may be invaluable in the search for American hostages in Beirut and Lebanon. The Pentagon, with its military mandate, preferred 'large, fast, complex drones that resembled pilotless fighter jets'. These, however, tended to be 'very expensive, technically sophisticated, and politically unpopular'.[27] Despite Twetten's concern that it sounded like 'a lawnmower in the sky', he and the new DCI were impressed enough when they visited Karem in California to place an order for his vehicle.[28] The UAV was modified throughout 1993 to improve the landing gear and engine, leading to changes to its nose configuration before the government took delivery of three vehicles and their ground control units at a cost of $31.7 million in the summer of 1994.[29] It had also been given a new name: The Predator.

Now that the CIA had acquired the latest UAV, however, the agency's bureaucratic competitors recognized the leap it had made, and the potential it offered. Tensions existed over the speed of development, with the CIA looking to deploy the Predator and gain valuable in-theatre data on its viability, while the Pentagon preferred to conduct theoretical tests before unleashing the technology. The operational debate was caused in part by bureaucratic pride, as well as territorial ambition. The suggestion that the CIA might operate an aircraft independent of the Air Force raised concerns at the Pentagon. Debate was also caused by concerns regarding the cost of the program, revealing tensions pertaining to the varying budget allocations across the federal government at the end of the Cold War. The Air Force believed that the CIA wanted 'to run everything and pay for nothing. They like to have sexy toys that do interesting things, so they can claim credit . . . and of course, they don't want to pay for it'.[30]

At the Pentagon, plans for a new generation of UAVs were drawn up by John M. Deutch, a former chemical engineer and MIT chemistry professor, who served as Under Secretary for Acquisition and Technology until March 1994. His engineering background and strong relationship with President Clinton ensured that Deutch was ideally placed to work with DCI Woolsey to secure UAVs for the federal government.[31] The Pentagon was reeling during the first years of the Clinton administration as it lurched from one crisis to another. The loss of the Black Hawks in Somalia was followed by setbacks in Haiti, and uncertainty in the Balkans, leading to the departure of Defense Secretary Aspin after only a year in office. In all three locations, a viable UAV platform would have been invaluable. In a declassified memo dated 12 July 1993, Deutch lamented that current assets were insufficient to provide 'urgently needed, critical, worldwide, reliable near real time intelligence information on mobile targets for the in-theatre Commander-in-Chief (CINC), the National Command Authority (NCA) or the Joint Force Commander'. This meant relying on assets that were 'limited by endurance of less than 8–12 hours . . . and possible loss of aircrew over hostile areas'. As early as 1993 Deutch recognized that 'no long-range endurance UAV will be available to military commanders until the year 2000'. To address this situation, the memo presented the requirements for a vehicle that could provide 'continuous all-weather' surveillance and 'coverage of world-wide targets'.[32]

The declassified Deutch memo ordered the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition to ensure that the Program Executive Office for the Cruise Missiles Project and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Joint Project 'expeditiously contract for an endurance UAV', with a range of 500 nautical miles, the ability to reconnoitre a target for 24 hours, the ability to fly at up to 25,000 feet, and to transmit imagery via satellite. To pre-empt bureaucratic resistance, the memo directed that such a system had to be 'demonstrated within six months and a field able prototype of that system consisting of three air vehicles and one ground control station delivered to the government within 12 months'. One this was achieved, a fully deployable UAV system, 'consisting of an additional 7 air vehicles and two ground control stations plus an upgrade of the original three air vehicles and one ground control station for a total of 10 air vehicles and three ground station controls' would be delivered in in 24 months.[33] Deutch's persistence ensured that the Predator was first flown on 3 July 1994, as an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD), a Pentagon initiative designed to fast-track new technology.[34]

Even within the Pentagon, however, bureaucratic rivalries emerged. Despite having initially been assigned to the Navy, the Air Force successfully petitioned to be designated as the lead Service for operating and maintaining the Predator. In a declassified memo dated 9 April 1996, entitled, 'Assignment of Service Lead for Operation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)', William Perry, who had succeeded Aspin as Secretary of Defense, concluded that the Predator had 'proved its ability to provide a significant and urgently needed reconnaissance capability'. Perry's decision became operational on 2 September 1996, as the Eleventh Reconnaissance Squadron, based at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, assumed control of the Predator. It was determined, however, that United States Atlantic Command would be the Combatant Command and the Navy Service Acquisition Executive would have responsibility for the system's development and procurement. This was decided, in large part, for bureaucratic reasons, since the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) did not cover missiles launched from the sea or the air. The bureaucratic decision to incorporate the three service branches was advanced as being vital to ensure that the Predator's potential was not hindered any further, with Perry insisting that 'the continued participation of each Service must be maintained'.[35]

The nascent UAV program appeared to be an elegant solution to several budgetary and political challenges. Not only were defence budgets under pressure following the end of the Cold War, but the administration was determined to focus on domestic issues and avoid un-necessary foreign interventions. These factors seemingly ensured an increasing focus on interagency cooperation, particularly in the Balkans, but despite this, problems continued to abound between the branches of the Department of Defence.

The United States Army had initially operated the Predator from Taszar in Hungary, flying remote missions into Bosnian airspace. Following the transition to the United States Air Force (USAF), the Army alleged that the change in operational control hindered its ability to enforce the truce in Bosnia following the signing of the Dayton Accords. To address these claims, a report was prepared by Colonel James G. Clark, Executive Assistant to the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff for Modelling and Simulation. Dated 28 March 1997, the declassified document alleged that the speed at which the Predator had moved from an Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) to an operational system was 'premature' and the 'fundamental root to the Predator problem'. The report noted that while the Predator had provided 'some excellent capability to US/NATO commanders in Bosnia', this has been achieved 'at the expense of the orderly transition from an ACTD to a proper initial operational capacity capability'. This, along with 'over-aggressive marketing', had resulted in 'unrealistic expectation of the first successful ACTD system especially in the harsh weather conditions of the Bosnian theatre of operations and resulted in the frustration of all involved'.[36]

The challenges the UAV program encountered in its developmental stage demonstrated Allison and Halperin's lament that 'decisions of a government seldom reflect a single coherent, consistent set of calculations about national security interests'.[37] Instead, departmental factors become involved. As Clark concluded in his report, the Predator's 'biggest problem is political'.[38] Clark did

not mean party political, but rather the bureaucratic politics that defined relations between the various branches of the armed forces. Clark concluded that the Army was 'still mad that they lost the program', and was seeking to 'prove that the [Air Force] cannot properly support their ground commanders and to regain control of the Predator program'. Clark insisted that the Air Force had 'no direct control over its own destiny with Predator as long as the Navy is in charge of the program office running the Joint Program Office'. Ultimately, he believed, 'Predator Program Management and Procurement responsibility must transfer to the USAF'.[39]

The problems plaguing the development of the UAV program were indicative of broader bureaucratic challenges facing the Clinton administration, as declassified memos reveal a lack of inter-agency communication: 'Too much happens at State and Defense without White House knowledge … the communicators of foreign policy are not well-armed with common material and not moving out in force'.[40] This internal debate and the continuing discussion regarding the presentation of policy highlighted a dilemma within the administration that went to the apex of power; would the federal bureaucracy adhere to the demands of the president of the United States? All too often, it was believed that it would not.

The long and drawn-out saga over the Predator's development exemplified Allison and Halperin's observation that within a bureaucracy, individuals 'make governmental decisions not by a single rational choice, but by pulling and hauling'.[41] This was further exemplified in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act, which made the final determination as to which branch of the military would be responsible for the Predator. The legislation ordered command authority to transfer to the Air Force. At the same time, the 1998 Intelligence Authorization Act ordered the Air Force to develop the Predator within the 645th Aeronautical Systems Group, known as Big Safari. On 15 April 1998, Jacques S. Gansler, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, officially directed the transfer of the Predator program from the Navy to Big Safari. The intradepartmental debate over the immediate future of the Predator within the Pentagon may have been decided, but interdepartmental bureaucratic challenges remained. The Predator, whatever its technical abilities or potential, remained 'a Hornets nest'.[42]

Challenge 2: deploying the UAV

Although the challenges facing the development of the UAV program were domestic, the issues relating to its deployment were hindered by bureaucratic politics of a far more international flavour. While inter-departmental rivalries exist within domestic politics, the very nature of foreign policy agencies exacerbates such tendencies, since they 'fall into the category of "procedural" organizations in which outputs can be observed but outcomes cannot'.[43] In such agencies, the presence of strong organizational cultures ensures a focus 'less on ends and more on means'.[44] During the 1990s, UAVs became increasingly utilized in a range of overseas operations as their surveillance capabilities improved and their viability came to be recognized. These technical developments, however, failed to prevent bureaucratic politics from impacting their deployment in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan during the Clinton administration.

The situation in the former Yugoslavia presented the Clinton administration with a series of challenges during its eight years in office. President George H. W. Bush had recoiled when presented with an opportunity to intervene militarily, and European leaders had likewise rejected direct U.S. military involvement. Jacques Delors, President of the European Community, insisted, 'we do not interfere in American affairs; we trust America will not interfere in European affairs', a stance echoed by Luxembourg's Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, who remarked that 'this is the hour of Europe, not of America'.[45] Such sentiments were, in the words of U.K. Defense Secretary Sir Malcolm Rifkind, 'simply foolish', revealing the extent of European impotence.[46] The conflict, however, eventually provided a testbed for the UAV program.

Despite a lack of U.S. troops on the ground, the Clinton administration participated in the NATO effort to patrol the skies over Bosnia as part of Operation *Deny Flight* that ran from April 1993 to

December 1995.[47] The White House increased the U-2 flights and oversaw an improved process to enable surveillance film to be transmitted to a ground facility in Italy for processing, rather than having to be flown to the United Kingdom for development.[48] The U-2 flights were supplemented by GNAT 750 UAVs operated by the U.S. Army out of the Gjader airbase in neighbouring Albania. As part of Operation *Deny Flight*, it was recognized that UAVs would 'enhance [U.S.] surveillance resources at low risk'.[49] This was vital, since it was apparent that a 'lack of good intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance was hampering U.S. efforts to understand and, if possible, contain' the fighting in the former Yugoslavia.[50]

NATO initiated Operation *Deliberate Force* between 30 August and 20 September 1995, providing yet another opportunity to deploy UAVs in a combat zone to determine the extent of their viability. During this time the GNAT-750 flew seven missions from bases in Croatia and Turkey. The operation also saw the introduction of the Predator, providing the Clinton administration with a major advancement in surveillance technology. The new vehicle flew 12 missions from its base in Gjader, overcoming range limitations that hampered the original GNAT-750 due to the installation of a new Satellite Communications (SATCOM) link. This ended the 'line-of-sight' era, as well as the need to place operators in relative proximity to the drone. The most important development was the endurance of the Predator, which could remain airborne for almost 24 hours.[51] 'The bad guys used to just wait for our fighter pilots to leave', recalled Air Force Major General Ken Israel, who headed the Pentagon office in charge of unmanned military aircraft at the time. 'They didn't have that option anymore' since the Predator allowed for acts of aggression to be observed and identified in near-real time, with only a 2-second delay.[52] Although several vehicles succumbed to inclement weather and enemy fire, their integration into battlefield operations granted their remote operators invaluable experience in 'piloting' the Predator under fire, as well as providing data about their reliability and areas to focus on for its evolution. Bureaucratic resistance, however, had hampered the development of the program by at least six years since the cancelled Amber drone had equalled the performance of the Predator as early as 1990.[53]

By 1999, UAVs were deployed as part of Operation *Allied Force*, designed to stem the Serbian assault on Albanians in the province of Kosovo.[54] Lasting from March 24 to June 10, this constituted not only the largest ever deployment of UAVs, but also the 'the third largest strategic application of air power by the United States since World War II, exceeded only by the Vietnam War and Operation Desert Storm in scale and intensity'.[55] Despite the operation's scope and importance, the U.S. Air Force initially refused to deploy its most advanced Predators since the manufacturer had sought to deliver them without the necessary technical manuals required to maintain and operate them. Three vehicles were eventually dispatched to operate out of Tuzla in Bosnia, but 'undisclosed technical difficulties' further delayed their deployment.[56]

Once operational, the Predator provided 'fabulous imagery of Serb forces, refugee movements and battle-damage assessments'. Improvements in image capture and communications were notable: 'That's the biggest thing now, to get those pictures in real time for tactical information so we can move on the targets as soon as we find them', said an allied official.[57] The UAVs were used to fulfil operational rules of engagement to validate pilot reports of possible Surface-to-Air missiles (SAM) or ground-force targets on the move, making 'forward air controllers out of what had previously been intelligence collectors'.[58] Their mission also evolved, from merely identifying targets to verifying their military nature, to minimizing the risk of collateral damage.[59] Had the conflict continued, plans called for the UAVs to be outfitted with laser designators to direct Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) to their designated targets and to be brought further into the targeting mechanism, rather than simply being used for intelligence gathering.[60] This constituted the continuation of a simple initiate: 'The goal now is to overwhelm the Serbs with technology'.[61] Technology, surveillance, and munitions were converging within the UAV project, and with their use in Kosovo 'it became clear that drone reconnaissance functions could be linked directly to real or near-real time targeting [as] these functions were seen to make the targeting process faster, more efficient, and more effective in

a more dynamic targeting environment'.[62] This proved invaluable for the Predator's subsequent deployment in Afghanistan.

The Clinton administration concluded as early as 1997 that the gravest threat to the United States originated in Afghanistan, where the Taliban government was harbouring Osama bin Laden. To address this growing threat, Richard Clarke was appointed National Coordinator for Counterterrorism. He had been among the first to note the growing threat of international terrorism in the post-Cold War era and remained an influential figure in U.S. counterterrorism throughout the administration, despite his willingness to highlight what he saw as being the shortcomings of several executive branch agencies.[63] Never before had one individual been so accountable for U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Although he had elevated the focus on counterterrorism as its main protagonist at the NSC, tensions existed between the various executive branch agencies, many of which failed to take the threat seriously, and took issue with his promotion. The Departments of Defense and Justice both opposed the establishment of a terrorism czar within the White House and sought to ensure that Clarke would not have an independent budget, or a dedicated staff, moves that directly impacted the evolution of the UAV program. As late as 2000, bureaucratic politics continued to impact the deployment of the Predator. Supply problems, costings, and bureaucratic resistance continued to hamper the project. Clarke noted the feedback from all departments was the same: 'Too risky. Too costly. Too not-invented here'.[64]

President Clinton authorized a 'proof of concept' operation for the Predator in Afghan airspace in September 2000 to determine if the UAV could be controlled from the CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. Predator operators were required work in the middle of the night due to the time difference between the United States and Afghanistan.[65] Fifteen missions were instigated, deploying the Predator to specific areas where bin Laden was believed to be operating in Afghanistan. The focus of the operation repeatedly returned to an area close to Kandahar airport, known as Tarnak Farm. The site had been previously identified as a location of interest, as revealed in a declassified memo dated 7 September 1998 in which Richard Clarke recommended 'a warning shot near the Tarnak complex at Kandahar … to keep the organization confused and off base'.[66] Two years later, on 7 September 2000, Predator imagery from the location revealed a tall man, dressed in white Arabic attire, attended to by a team of heavily armed bodyguards. Destroying the site with a cruise missile strike was the most immediate option available, presenting, as it did, no immediate risk to U.S. service personnel and the appearance of a robust response in the weeks leading up to the 2000 election. Such a response would certainly have killed the mysterious figure at the facility if he were present. The imagery from the Predator, however, revealed that whoever the individual was, he had surrounded himself with women and children, providing a formidable human shield against precisely the kind of military response under consideration.[67]

Preventing collateral damage was as important to the White House as the central mission of targeting bin Laden, since 'Americans insisted on capturing the king without disturbing the pawns'.[68] Whatever the potential benefit of a successful strike, the fear of inflicting massive collateral damage weighed heavily on the White House. In a pre-9/11 era, Bill Clinton 'had to be a responsible leader of the free world and be measured and coherent and not kill too many civilians'.[69] Speaking after he left office, Bill Clinton reflected 'it's almost like he was daring me to kill them'. He noted, however that 'I do not care how precise your bombs and your weapons are, when you set them off, innocent people will die'.[70] The imagery provided by the Predator convinced the administration of the importance of the UAV platform, but with only weeks remaining before its departure from office, the Clinton administration was running out of time.[71]

As Martha Crenshaw observed, 'American counterterrorism policy is not just a response to the threat of terrorism, whether at home or abroad, but a reflection of the domestic political process'.[72] The political capital the Clinton administration had accrued by winning two successive elections had been exhausted. This was coupled with the election of 2000, in which Al Gore was seeking to become only the second sitting vice president to succeed his boss in an election since Martin Van Buren in 1836.[73] With relations already strained due to the impeachment process, the Clinton White House

was eager not to hinder Gore's chances, ensuring that potentially risky foreign policy initiatives were quietly placed to one side as the electoral process played out.

The deployment of the Predator to Afghanistan was ultimately short lived, not just because of political or military considerations, but due to the climate. The vehicle struggled to make headway against high winds and could easily be blown off target. Extreme cold also caused ice to form on the Predator's wings, affecting its aerodynamic properties. It was, therefore, extremely susceptible to the extreme cold and high winds that characterized the Afghan winter, forcing the Clinton administration to halt the operation. By the time the weather had improved in Afghanistan, Bill Clinton was no longer president, and a new team was in place in the White House that had yet to appreciate the threats posed by terrorism, or the potential benefits of UAV technology.

What remained was the bureaucratic in-fighting over the cost of the UAV program. Once the testing ended in Afghanistan, 'a battle erupted in Washington over the future of program'.[74] The source of the tension was the cost of the operations and who was expected to pay. Eventually, in December, Secretary of the Air Force, Whit Peters, secured funding to cover the costs associated with the operation, but the future of the Predator was by no means certain, despite its successful deployments.[75] What was required, was a way to end the Predator's dependency on cruise missiles, fired from hundreds of miles away, with no guarantee that the target would still be at the location by the time of impact. The Air Force discussed having an armed vehicle ready by 2004. Richard Clarke ordered them to have it ready in three months, by spring 2001.[76] Arming the Predator was the final bureaucratic challenge to be overcome and would be the most impactful for the vehicle's future and international standing.

Challenge 3: arming the UAV

Throughout the 1990s the Predator remained a reconnaissance vehicle, evolving to incorporate a movable camera, radar imaging, and electronic intercept equipment.[77] The vehicle repeatedly demonstrated its ability to provide a reliable platform for intelligence gathering during its deployment in the Balkans, as well as for confirming reported movements. The initial technical and bureaucratic challenges, therefore, appeared to have been addressed. To the State Department and the CIA, the Predator was more than sufficient, but for the Pentagon, its surveillance capability represented only a fraction of the vehicle's true potential. The desire to arm the Predator proved to be the final challenge facing the Clinton administration as it sought to overcome the technical and bureaucratic hurdles that this development presented.

Although the Predator was incapable of deploying weaponry during the 1990s, this development had been considered at the Pentagon, which was eager to integrate the Predator into the operational procedures used to instigate an armed attack on an enemy, known as the kill chain. The initial plan was to incorporate the Predator into the Pentagon's Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTAR) platform, designed to do for ground operations what the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) system had previously done for air operations. The benefits offered by the Predator, with its ability to transmit real-time imagery, 'paint' a target with a laser beam, and direct a computer-guided weapon to its target was apparent. Accordingly, tests began in 1995 to link the Predator drone to submerged submarines with a view to guiding sea-based missiles. Four years later, the Air Force equipped Predators 'with laser target finders and satellite links that [made] drone-guided bombing operations possible for the first time, although no such attacks were actually carried out'.[78]

Despite the development that this represented to the mission and functionality of the Predator, it still utilized the UAV as a surveillance tool, albeit one that was directly incorporated into the kill chain. The next step was to arm the Predator with an air-to-ground weapon, launched by a remote operator. In the 1990s, however, the dimensions of the Predator constrained the array of armaments that it could physically incorporate, and its range and distance from base had implications in terms of its ability to instigate a missile strike from a remote location.

The idea of arming the Predator had been discussed at the White House and promoted by Richard Clark, whose own enthusiasm for the concept was encouraged by President Clinton's 'constant demand for innovation and creativity'.[79] At the Pentagon the intent to arm the Predator came on 1 May 2000, by Air Force General John Jumper, Chief of Air Combat Command. At the time the Air Force possessed 16 vehicles, with plans to expand the fleet over the coming three years, but with no thought of exceeding 50. A month later, in June 2000, the task of arming the Predator fell to the Air Force's Big Safari team, the Predator's System Program Office. The initiative was not linked to Afghanistan, but rather to the conflict in Kosovo, where it was hoped that having identified targets, an armed Predator could be used to attack them. This, in General Jumper's estimation, was the next logical step in the vehicle's evolution.

Since the Air Force had no missiles light enough to be considered, the decision was made to utilize an Army weapon, the Antitank Guided Missile (AGM)-114 Heliborne-Launched Fire-and-Forget Missile, known as the Hellfire. With a plan in place, and internal Army bureaucracy overcome, the technical hurdle of equipping the Hellfire to the Predator presented itself.[80] Armed with a budget of $3 million, Big Safari had to devise a way to ensure that neither the thrust from the launch of the Hellfire, nor the heat from its propulsion system, caused irreplicable damage to the Predator. Despite these technical challenges, on 16 February 2001, a little under a month after the Clinton administration left office, the first Hellfire missile was fired from an airborne Predator. The CIA, however, continued to oppose the idea of arming the Predator. As Nancy Soderberg observed, the Predator had become 'a hot potato … tossed away as quickly as possible, the CIA and the Air Force argued about who should run and fund the operation'.[81]

The CIA had its own record to consider. Throughout its history, the agency had been involved in a series of covert activities designed to overthrow foreign governments and install new, pro-American regimes. This had, on occasion, involved assassination plots in countries including Chile, the Dominican Republic, South Vietnam, Cuba, and Zaire. These activities had come to light during the United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, known as the Church Committee. Chaired by Senator Frank Church, the committee was established in 1975 to investigate claims of 'illegal, improper, or unethical' activity conducted by the IRS, the FBI, the NSA, and the CIA.[82] The committee branded the use of assassination by U.S. federal entities as being 'immoral, logistically precarious, and liable to be counter-productive'. It noted, further, that 'a system which relies on secrecy increases the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment were most necessary'.[83] Although the committee's desire for legislation outlawing the use of assassination was not successful, the Ford administration issued Executive Order 11,905 on 18 February 1976, stipulating that 'No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination'. This was subsequently reiterated in two further executive orders released by Presidents Carter and Reagan in 1978 and 1981 respectively.[84] The UAV program may well have 'represented a miraculous new tool of spycraft', but, once armed, it threatened to become 'something more lethal and troubling'. A fully armed and operational UAV risked being 'remote controlled killing machines, raising legal and ethical quandaries'.[85] With its operational history, the CIA leadership was understandably anxious to avoid being drawn into a public debate surrounding the legal niceties involved in the use of a UAV to target specific individuals.[86]

During its eight years in office, the Clinton administration initiated a series of initiatives designed to overcome domestic bureaucratic resistance to its counterterrorism policies and practices. In January 1996, it established 'Alec Station' within the CIA's Counterterrorism Center(CTC) as a dedicated, 'virtual station' devoted to tracking bin Laden and al-Qaeda. It was hoped that Alec Station 'could find out whom bin Laden was funding and who, in turn, might be funding him; it was also hoped that the knowledge might open up new ways to disrupt terrorist operations'.[87] The administration also instigated a series of Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) designed to address the growing threat.[88] These included PDD-39, issued in June 1995, which required the CIA and FBI to work together and 'achieve maximum cooperation regarding terrorism, as legally permissible'. The

two were ordered to 'share, where appropriate, terrorism-related intelligence and law enforcement information expeditiously and efficiently'.[89] The fact that this had to be spelled out so starkly was a clear indication of the problems that had long plagued relations between the two organizations and continued to prove a challenge in the years ahead.[90] National Security Adviser Anthony Lake conceded that inter-agency struggles influenced the wording of PDD-39 as 'the NSC had to reconcile a conflict between Treasury and the FBI over Treasury's role in the NSC chaired group that coordinates US counterterrorism policy'.[91]

Of specific importance to the developing UAV program was the Memorandum of Notification signed by President Clinton in 1998, directing the CIA to utilize assets within Afghanistan to engage bin Laden, primarily with the intention of capturing him. This was later amended to include bin Laden's key lieutenants, and to authorize the shooting down of any aircraft or helicopter he might use to escape Afghanistan.[92] The memorandum was intended 'to encourage the CIA to carry out an effective operation against bin Laden, not to burden the agency with constraints or doubts'. Vitally, however, the administration was hesitant to put on paper any order 'that could be interpreted by Afghan agents as an unrestricted license to kill'. Despite a belief within the White House that the executive order prohibiting assassinations did not extend to bin Laden, it was understood that any such language would be vigorously opposed by the Justice Department.[93] Richard Clarke conceded that the administration was unwilling to approve a straightforward killing and therefore produced a series of unusual documents giving 'extremely specific authorities for particular CIA operations aimed at bin Laden'.[94] According to Clarke, 'there was concern in both the Justice Department and in some elements of the White House and some elements of the CIA that we not create an American hit-list that would become an ongoing institution that we could just keep adding names to and have hit teams go out and assassinate people'.[95] The severity of the threat was not lost on the highest levels of the CIA, with DCI George Tenet conceding in 1998, 'We are at War'.[96] He later noted that, despite subsequent claims to the contrary, 'the Clinton administration understood fully the nature of the threat we were facing'.[97] However, he also insisted that, 'almost every authority granted to CIA prior to 9/11 made it clear that just going out and assassinating Bin Laden would not have been permissible or acceptable', revealing the bureaucratic division between members of Alec Station who were committed to striking bin Laden, and the leadership that were reticent to authorize a targeted killing.[98] During 9/11 Commission hearings, CIA officials and lawyers uniformly said that they had interpreted authorities signed by Clinton as instructing them to try to capture bin Laden alive and that the only acceptable context for killing him would be during a credible operation aimed at capture.[99] Two senior CIA officers later said they would have been 'morally and practically opposed to getting CIA into what might look like an assassination'. One went so far as to say he would have 'refused an order to directly kill Bin Laden'.[100]

The debate surrounding the legality of the UAV program had bureaucratic and diplomatic aspects to address. The adoption of the Predator raised questions throughout the government relating to its mission parameters and how best to define the technology: Was this an aircraft, a missile, or something altogether different? The apparent semantic nature of this debate intensified with plans to weaponize the Predator, a development that caused the State Department to question whether such a move contravened the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), prohibiting the development of any new long-range cruise missiles. Signed on 8 December 1987, the INF Treaty compelled the United States and the Soviet Union to decommission their cruise missiles and other ground-launched ballistic missiles that had a range of between 300–3,300 miles. The treaty identified a ground-launched cruise missile as 'an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path' and 'a weapon-delivery vehicle'. Understandably, this language gave reason for concern within the bureaucracy that arming a UAV would constitute a violation of the INF treaty. In the late summer of 2000, the State Department General Counsel ruled that the Predator fit in the cruise missile category of the INF treaty, and was, therefore, a violation of the agreement, resulting in the temporary suspension of work on the project.[101]

Declassified emails from September 2000 indicate the impact that this bureaucratic decision had on the technical challenges that were being addressed at the time. Messages forwarded between Colonel James Clark and his colleague at the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, Lt. Colonel Kenneth Johns, reveal the increasing bureaucratic frustrations: 'Predator Weaponization is basically stopped until OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense) can get reversal of the current State Department position that the weaponized Predator aircraft is interpreted as a cruised missile for INF treaty purposes'.[102] There was a growing sense that the future of the Predator program was in doubt if the State Department ruling was not overturned. The bureaucratic challenge to arming the UAV program directly impacted the technical issues facing the program, as it was determined that no flying drones could be armed until a determination be made regarding their status under the INF treaty.[103]

Less than a month before the Clinton administration left office, on 2 January 2001, the United States government concluded that the UAV program was not in technical or legal violation of the treaty. The conclusion was derived on the basis that the treaty targeted cruise missiles with a warhead. The UAV was neither, but rather vehicle with the capacity to be remote piloted to a location and to subsequently return safely. The UAV's landing gear clearly signified that this was not a cruise missile, as addressed in the INF treaty, but an aircraft, and therefore permissible.

The concept of arming the Predator, therefore, was considered and developed during the Clinton administration. Bureaucratic and technical challenges, however, ensured that it remained a surveillance platform throughout the Clinton presidency, only becoming operationalized after 20 January 2001.[104] Whilst it was clear during the Clinton years that the UAV program would evolve, the exact method by which it was to deliver a deadly payload remained in dispute until after the administration's departure from office.

Clinton's UAV legacy

The issues that continue to surround the use of UAVs have their origins during the Clinton administration; questions surrounding executive accountability, bureaucratic control of the vehicle, their standing in international law; and the repercussions surrounding the potential for collateral damage. As the Biden administration seeks to address the continuing debate surrounding their use, it must weigh, as its predecessors did, the potential advantages that stem from the use of UAVs with the costs that are incurred when they fail to perform as expected. The current debate surrounding the use of UAVs is only the latest attempt to regulate their use, following concerns at their deployment by administrations from both political parties. Almost 60 drone strikes occurred under the George W. Bush administration, a figure that grew almost tenfold under the Obama administration, which launched 563 such operations.[105] A policy shift was announced at the National Defense University by President Obama on 23 May 2013, when he conceded that 'this new technology raises profound questions – about who is targeted, and why; about civilian casualties, and the risk of creating new enemies; about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law; about accountability and morality'. He noted that while 'the use of drones is heavily constrained … it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties'. He insisted, however, that 'before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured – the highest standard we can set'.[106] Three years later, the Obama administration declassified its rules for UAV deployment.[107] The Obama era regulations were overturned in October 2017 by the Trump administration, which granted far greater authority to local field operators. The exact number of operations conducted under the Trump administration, however, is disputed due to an executive order dated 6 March 2019 that revoked the requirement to make such information publicly available.

The Biden administration suspended the Trump era regulations on its first day in office, determined to implement its own regulations regarding the use of UAVs. No such operations were authorized in the first six months of the new administration, until an operation in Somalia and the subsequent mission in Afghanistan on 29 August 2021. The reaction to the loss of life in this

operation reflected concerns within the administration regarding the continued use of the UAV program. Yet it has recently deployed over one hundred new generation UAVs, including the Switchback and the General Atomics MQ-1C GrayEagle, to defend Ukraine, a conflict in which drones are becoming a dominant feature.[108] As the Biden administration is discovering in Ukraine, there have been good reasons for their previous deployment, particularly the lack of risk to American aircrews and the tactical advantage that the vehicle offers.[109]

Conclusion

This article has utilized declassified materials to reveal the bureaucratic challenges the Clinton administration overcame to develop and deploy Unnamed Arial Vehicles during its time in office. The application of the Bureaucratic Politics Model to these documents has revealed the extent to which the United States faced a series of organisational hurdles that hindered the battlefield readiness of the UAV program, ensuring that a fully armed platform was not operational until after the Clinton administration left office in January 2001.

During the 1990s a series of events and circumstances combined to challenge the direction and implementation of U.S. grand strategy; the Cold War had ended, there was a lack of direction in the White House, uncertainty prevailed in Bosnia, peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Haiti had gone badly leading to the departure of the defence secretary and a reappraisal of policy. These events contributed to the bureaucratic dichotomy between not only the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon, but also between the Executive Branch and Congress. In this environment, the UAV program became a political football, as the advantages that the platform delivered in terms of its surveillance capability were diminished as bureaucratic in-fighting stymied its development, deployment, and eventual armament.

Although the Clinton administration was not the first to utilize drones, it was the first to actively incorporate them into the front line of U.S. military deployments and to recognize their potential as both a reconnaissance platform, and later as a delivery mechanism for deadly munitions. At every juncture, the development of the UAV program was hindered by bureaucratic politics. Interdepartmental conflicts were compounded by intradepartmental challenges, all of which compounded the challenges faced by the Clinton administration as it sought to incorporate a new generation of technology into the United States' kill chain. For an administration that was eager to implement new initiatives whilst minimizing the cost of overseas deployments, the development and deployment of UAV technology was a logical step to take. Unmanned vehicles mitigated the threats to American pilots and reduced costs in an era of severe budgetary constraints. During the 1990s, however, UAV technology could only ever frustrate its targets, since it could 'neither eliminate [a terrorist] network entirely, nor completely neutralize the threat that it poses", and was, therefore, 'a tactic . . . not a strategy'.[110] It did, however, prove to be an effective, cost-efficient tool to be deployed in the furtherance of Clinton's Grand Strategy and an important precursor for the armed vehicles that subsequently became central to U.S. military efforts around the world.

Notes

1. White House, Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan, August 16, 2021.
2. See Shaw, *Predator Empire;* Bartsch, Coyne and Gray, *Drones in Society;* Fuller, 'The Eagle Comes Home to Roost'; Sweetman, 'Drones: Invented and Forgotten'.
3. Weldes, "Bureaucratic Politics", 218.
4. Drezner, 'Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy', 735. See also Zegart, *Flawed by Design*, 1999.
5. Neustadt, *Presidential Power*, 33.
6. See Schilling, Hammond, and Snyder, *Strategy, Politics, And Defense Budgets*, 1962; Neustadt, *Alliance Politics*, 1970; Hilsman, *To Move a Nation*, 1967.

7. See Destler, *Presidents, Bureaucrats and Foreign Policy*, 1972; Steinbrunner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, 1974; Gallucci, *Neither Peace Nor Honor*, 1975; Spanier, J., and E. Uslaner, *How American Foreign Policy is Made*, 1974.
8. See Allison, *The Essence of Decision*, 1971; Allison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications', 1972; Halpern, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, 1974.
9. Allison, *Essence of Decision*, 167.
10. Hoyt, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Foreign Policy Process", 2.
11. Miles, Jr., "The Origin and Meaning of Miles' Law", 399.
12. Allison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics', 44.
13. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy", 486.
14. Freedman, "Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes", 438.
15. Hoyt, "Bureaucratic Politics and the Foreign Policy Process", 6.
16. van Dijk, "Discourse & Society", 14.
17. Ikenberry, "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror", 26.
18. Boys, 'A Lost Opportunity'; McAllister, 'When to Go, When to Stay', 40.
19. Clines, 'Conflict in the Balkans'.
20. The events surrounding the deaths in Somalia were documented in Bowden, *Black Hawk Down*, and adopted into a film of the same name directed by Ridley Scott. The rescue of Scott O'Grady was the basis for the 2001 film, *Behind Enemy Lines*.
21. Author's interview with Charles A. Kupchan, (Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, 1993–1994), January 24, 2104.
22. Art, 'Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy', 468.
23. EG, Draft memo to NS (Nancy Soderberg) et al, re: Investment Priorities or Restructured Military, August 11, 1992, Box 11, File 9, Anthony Lake Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
24. Sale, *Clinton's Wars*, 103.
25. Whipple, *Spy Masters*,159.
26. See Sweetman, 'Drones: Invented and Forgotten', 34; Finn, 'Rise of the Drone'.
27. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 521–2.
28. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 522.
29. Whittle, 'The Man Who Invented the Predator'.
30. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 527.
31. Whipple, *Spy Masters*, 159.
32. John M. Deutch, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition, 'Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program', July 12, 1993. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%201%20-%20Deutch%20Endurance%20UAV%20Memo%2012%20July%201993.pdf.
33. Attachment to John M. Deutch, Memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & Acquisition, 'Endurance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Program', July 12, 1993. Available at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%201percent20%20Deutch%20Endurance%20UAV%20Memo%2012percent20July%201993.pdf.
34. See Thirtle, Johnson, and J Birkler, *The Predator ACTD*.
35. William J. Perry, Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Undersecretaries of Defense, Subject: Assignment of Service Lead for Operation of the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), April 9, 1996. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%202%20-%20Air%20Force%20assigned%20as%20Predator%20lead%20service%209%20April%201996.pdf.
36. Colonel James G. Clark, Memorandum for AF/CVA, From AF/CVSM, Subject: Predator, March 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%203%20-%20Snake%20Clark%20Taszar%20trip%20report%20%2028%20April%201997.pdf.
37. Allison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications', 53.
38. Colonel James G. Clark, Memorandum for AF/CVA, From AF/CVSM, Subject: Predator, March 1997. Available at https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/PredatorWhittle%20Document%203percent20%20Snake%20Clark%20Taszar%20trip%20report%20percent2028percent20April%201997.pdf.
39. Colonel James G. Clark, Memorandum for AF/CVA, From AF/CVSM, Subject: Predator, March 1997. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB484/docs/Predator-Whittle%20Document%203%20-%20Snake%20Clark%20Taszar%20trip%20report%20%2028%20April%201997.pdf.
40. Tara Sonenshine and Tom Ross to Mark Gearan; re: Six-Month Public Affairs Strategy, June 10, 1994, Clinton Presidential Records, National Security Council, Robert Boorstin (Speechwriting), OA/Box Number: 420, NSC – Public Affairs Strategy, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, Little Rock, AR.
41. Allison and Halperin, 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications', 43.
42. Benjamin and Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, 344.

43. Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, 164.
44. Drezner, 'Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Crafting of Foreign Policy', 736.
45. Delors, quoted in Holbrooke, *To End a War*, 21; Poos, quoted in Dickie, *Special No More*, 248.
46. Author's interview with Sir Malcolm Rifkind, October 8, 2013.
47. Operation *Deny Flight* ran from 12 April 1993 to December 20, 1995, following UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816 granted it authority to intercept and, if necessary, shoot down aircraft violating the prohibition. The force was made up form aircraft provided by the United States, United Kingdom, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey. The patrol aircraft were based in Italy, or on US, British, and French aircraft carriers in the Adriatic.
48. Sale, *Clinton's Secret Wars*, 124.
49. Sargent, 'Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force', 256.
50. See Woods, 'The Story of America's Very First Drone Strike'.
51. Sargent, 'Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force', 256–257.
52. See Woods, 'The Story of America's Very First Drone Strike'.
53. Sweetman, 'Drones: Invented and Forgotten', 34.
54. Referred to in the United States as Operation *Noble Anvil*.
55. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, v.
56. 'Air Force Reluctant to Deploy All-Weather Predator UAVs to Balkans', 1.
57. Becker, 'Crisis in the Balkans', A15.
58. General John P. Jumper, quoted in 'Jumper on Air Power', 42.
59. Lambeth, *NATO's Air War for Kosovo*, 95–96.
60. Fulghum, 'Kosovo Conflict Spurred New Airborne Technology Use', 30.
61. Becker, 'Crisis in the Balkans', A15. For a miliary assessment of the UAV deployment in Kosovo, see Dixon, *UAV Employment in Kosovo*.
62. Kindervater, 'The Emergence of Lethal Surveillance', 231.
63. Dobbs, 'An Obscure Chief in U.S. War on Terror', A1. See also Gellman, 'Struggles Inside the Government Defined Campaign'; Robert Suro and Dana Priest, 'Plan to Overhaul Anti-Terrorism Strategy Would Boost NSC's Role'; Weiner, 'The Man Who Protects America from Terrorism'.
64. Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, 220.
65. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 526; Benjamin and Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, 322–23.
66. National Security Council and NSC Emails, 'Declassified Document Concerning Tarnak Farm', *Clinton Digital Library*, available at https://clinton.presidentiallibraries.us/items/show/101152. Declassified memorandum from Richard A. Clarke to Simon N. Steven, September 8, 1998, detailing contents of memorandum from Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, Update on Project, September 7, 1998. Clinton Presidential Records, NSC Emails Exchange-Record (Sept 1997- January 2001) ([Tarnak]), O/A Box Number 620,000. Folder Title: [10/15/1997-09/30/2000].
67. See Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 529–531, 542–544; Boys, *Clinton's War on Terror*, 210–211.
68. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 529.
69. Author's interview with J.F.O. McAllister, July 26, 2017.
70. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 529; Clinton made his comments in an interview with Jonathan Alter. 'I don't care . . . people will die' is from Clinton's speech to the British Labour Party conference, October 3, 2002.
71. Gellman, 'A Strategy's Cautious Evolution'.
72. Martha Crenshaw, 'Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process', 329.
73. The only other sitting vice president to do so was George H. W. Bush in 1988.
74. Benjamin and Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, 322.
75. Benjamin and Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, 322.
76. Clarke, *Against All Enemies*, 221.
77. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 523.
78. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 524. See also Robinson, 'Submarine to Test Linkup with Predator UAV Later This Year', 345; Holzer, 'U.S. Subs Gear for Broader Mission', 3.
79. Soderberg, *Superpower Myth*, 160–61.
80. Whittle, 'Hellfire Meets Predator'.
81. Soderberg, *Superpower Myth*, 160–61.
82. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Document 31.
83. Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, S. Rept. 94–465 at 258; 282, 7 (1975).
84. See Trenta, 'Remote Killing?' 468–488.
85. Whipple, *Spy Masters*,160.
86. See Banka and Quinn, 'Killing Norms Softly', 665–703; Trenta, "An Act of Insanity and National Humiliation", 121–140.
87. Benjamin and Simon, *Age of Sacred Terror*, 243; Nestler, *Hearts, Minds and Hydras*, 53.
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94. Waterman, 'Assassination Ban "No Shield" for al-Qaida'.
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96. Chollet and Goldgeiger, *American Between the Wars*, 267.
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100. 9/11 Commission, "Staff Statement No. 7", Hearing before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 24 March 2004, 3.
101. For more, see Coll, *Ghost War*, 543.
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103. Whittle, 'Hellfire Meets Predator'.
104. Gellman, 'A Strategy's Cautious Evolution', A1. On February 4, 2002, the first attempt to launch a Hellfire missile from a Predator resulted in the death of an innocent civilian, mistaken for Osama bin Laden. The first confirmed death of a targeted individual by a U.S. UAV came on November 4, 2002, when Al-Harethi, who had engineered the attack on the *USS Cole* bombing, was killed in Yemen.
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106. White House, Remarks by the President' at the National Defense University, May 23, 2013.
107. Savage, 'U.S. Releases Rules for Airstrike Killing of Terror Suspects'.
108. Detsch, 'Drones Have Come of Age in Russia-Ukraine War'; Axe, 'Ukraine Isn't Just Getting American-Made Killer Drones'.
109. See Nakashima and Ryan, 'Biden Orders Temporary Limits on Drone Strikes Outside War Zones'; Hadley, 'Pentagon Reveals Secretive New Drone the Air Force is Giving to Ukraine'.
110. Hoffman, 'American Jihad', 21.

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